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Abstract 
Although the usefulness of belief networks 
for reasoning under uncertainty is widely 
accepted, obtaining numerical probabilities 
that they require is still perceived a major 
obstacle. Often not enough statistical data 
is available to allow for reliable probability 
estimation. Available information may not 
be directly amenable for encoding in the net­
work. Finally, domain experts may be reluc­
tant to provide numerical probabilities. In 
this paper, we propose a method for elici­
tation of probabilities from a domain expert 
that is non-invasive and accommodates what­
ever probabilistic information the expert is 
willing to state. We express all available in­
formation, whether qualitative or quantita­
tive in nature, in a canonical form consisting 
of (in)equalities expressing constraints on the 
hyperspace of possible joint probability dis­
tributions. We then use this canonical form 
to derive second-order probability distribu­
tions over the desired probabilities. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
As the increasing number of successful applications 
demonstrate, belief networks [Pearl, 1988] have by now 
established their position of valuable representations 
of uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (AI) research. 
A belief network (also referred to as probabilistic net­
work or causal network) consists of a qualitative part, 
encoding a domain's variables and the probabilistic in­
fluences among them in a directed graph, and a quan­
titative part, encoding probabilities over these vari­
ables. Building the qualitative part of a belief network 
has parallels to other AI approaches and, although it 
may require significant effort, generally is not consid­
ered the hardest part in belief network construction. 
In most cases this task is dominated by the task of 
acquiring the quantification of the network. 
Quantifying a belief network amounts to assessing 
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probability distributions for each of the network's vari­
ables conditional on their direct predecessors in the 
directed graph. In most domains, at least some infor­
mation is available to this end, be it from literature or 
from domain experts. However, this information often 
is not directly amenable to encoding in a belief net­
work. For example, available information may not be 
numerical in nature. An expert may be certain of the 
fact that some values of a statistical variable A make 
some values of a variable B more likely, and perhaps 
have an idea of the lower and upper bounds on the 
numerical strength of this influence, yet may not be 
able to give exact numbers. Also, available probabil­
ities may not match the probabilities to be assessed. 
Medical literature, for example, often reports proba­
bilities of symptoms given diseases but usually not the 
probabilities of symptoms given no diseases and not 
necessarily the specific probabilities required for the 
intermediate disease states modeled in the network. 
Moreover, experts may feel more confident providing 
estimates of conditional probabilities in the diagnostic 
direction than in the causal direction of probabilistic 
influence. 
Probabilistic information is available in many different 
shapes. It ranges from numerical point and interval 
probabilities, through order of magnitude estimates 
and signs of influences and synergies, to purely qualita­
tive statements concerning independence of variables. 
This range has inspired a variety of schemes for rea­
soning under uncertainty. Some of these schemes build 
on quantitative information such as belief networks 
[Pearl, 1988] and undirected graphical models [Whit­
taker, 1990]; others build on partial numerical specifi­
cations, allowing for interval rather than point prob­
abilities [Breese and Fertig, 1991; Coletti et al., 1991; 
Coletti, 1994; van der Gaag, 1991] or for order of mag­
nitude estimates [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1992]. Yet 
other schemes are purely qualitative in nature, such 
as qualitative probabilistic networks [Wellman, 1990]. 
Also non-probabilistic schemes have been proposed, 
each addressing a specific type of uncertainty, such 
as Dempster-Shafer theory [Shafer, 1976], possibility 
theory [Zadeh, 1978], and non-monotonic logics [Pearl, 
1989]. Each of these schemes typically allows for en-
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coding only a few types of information. A unifying 
principle that would allow combining the various types 
of information has been lacking so far, making it hard 
to utilize the variety of information available in prac­
tice. 
With the purpose of quantifying belief networks in 
mind, we propose a method for accommodating both 
qualitative and quantitative probabilistic information 
about a yet unknown joint probability distribution Pr 
over a set of variables V. The basic idea of our method 
is to consider the distribution hyperspace of all possible 
joint probability distributions over V. The true, yet 
unknown distribution Pr is a point in this hyperspace. 
If no information is available about Pr, then the true 
distribution can be any point in the distribution hy­
perspace. Information about Pr, whether qualitative 
or quantitative, expresses a constraint on the hyper­
space since certain distributions become incompatible 
with this information. Probability elicitation can now 
be looked upon as constraining the distribution hyper­
space as much as possible. To this end, we express all 
probabilistic information that is available about the 
unknown distribution as constraints. Assuming that 
all joint probability distributions that are compatible 
with the available information are equally likely, we 
then derive second-order probability distributions over 
the probabilities to be assessed. These second-order 
distributions may be used directly or may be a starting 
point for further refinement. Note that our approach 
provides a common denominator for various types of 
probabilistic information. Also note that by interpret­
ing the qualitative and quantitative information that 
a domain expert is willing to state, we effectively pro­
vide for non-invasive elicitation of probabilities. We 
believe that our method is a valuable supplement to 
the classical decision-analytic techniques of probability 
elicitation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 introduces a simple belief network that will 
be used throughout the paper and gives examples of 
probabilistic information that is typically available for 
quantifying a network. Section 3 presents a canoni­
cal form for representing probabilistic information and 
Section 4 describes interpretation of various types of 
information within this canonical form. Section 5 
demonstrates how information expressed in canonical 
form can be used to derive second-order probability 
distributions over probabilities of interest. We finish 
with a discussion and an outline of directions for fur­
ther research in Section 6. 
2 AN EXAMPLE 
Consider building a highly simplified belief network 
modeling causes of HIV virus infection. Our network 
includes four variables: HIV infection (H) ,  needle 
sharing (N), sexual intercourse (I), and use of a con­
dom (C). We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that 
these variables are binary; for example H has two out-
comes, denoted h and h, representing "HIV infection 
present" and "HIV infection absent," respectively. 
The first step in building a belief network is to design 
its structure in terms of probabilistic influences among 
its variables. Belief networks achieve clarity and large 
savings in terms of storage of a joint probability dis­
tribution by explicit representation of the indepen­
dences holding among its variables. These indepen­
dences are encoded in a directed acyclic graph, where 
each node represents a variable and each arc repre­
sents, informally speaking, a direct probabilistic influ­
ence between its incident nodes. Absence of an arc be­
tween two variables means that these variables do not 
influence each other directly, and hence are (condition­
ally) independent. For orienting the arcs in the graph, 
it is generally considered good practice to reflect the 
causal mechanisms [Druzdzel and Simon, 1993] of the 
domain. In our example, we may reasonably assume 
that sharing needles and condom usage are indepen­
dent. Similarly, whether or not a person shares needles 
may be assumed independent of whether this person 
engages in sexual intercourse. One possible graph re­
flecting our beliefs concerning HIV infection is shown 
in Figure 1. 
Intercourse (I) 
HIV infection (H) 
Figure 1: An example belief network for HIV infection. 
Once the qualitative part of a network is considered 
robust, the network is quantified. To this end, for 
each variable the probabilities of its values conditional 
on the values of its direct predecessors in the graph 
have to be assessed. For the graph shown in Fig­
ure 1, numbers representing Pr(N), Pr(I), Pr(C\I), 
and Pr(H\N IC) are required. Obtaining these num­
bers is considered to be far more difficult than con­
figuring the qualitative part of the network, mainly 
because of difficulties in obtaining statistical data and 
in eliciting probabilities from domain experts. In our 
example, there are several sources of information that 
can help in obtaining the required probabilities. Mor­
bidity tables may provide Pr(h), a point estimate of 
the prevalence of HIV in the population of interest. 
We may get ball-park estimates on frequencies of sex­
ual intercourse and condom usage in intercourse, that 
is, Pr(i) and Pr(c\i). We further know that condoms 
are used primarily during intercourse, so Pr(i\c) is 
close to zero. In addition, various populations of in­
travenous drug users have been studied with respect 
to their needle sharing habits. Findings from these 
studies may help in assessing Pr(n). Also, statistics 
may be obtained concerning the way of contracting 
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HIV from among the infected population, yielding es­
timates for Pr(nlh) and Pr(ilh), or perhaps even for 
Pr(iclh) and Pr(iclh). There is also semi-numerical 
information available. For example, the probability 
of contracting HIV by needle sharing is higher than 
the probability of contracting it in sexual intercourse, 
that is, Pr(hln) > Pr(hli). Also, the relatively small 
number of intravenous drug users compared to the 
size of the sexually active population suggests that 
Pr(i) > Pr(n). 
Besides (semi-)numerical information, we have a body 
of qualitative information on the subject. We are 
quite certain that both sharing a needle and a sex­
ual intercourse with an HIV carrier make infection 
more likely. We know that using a condom during 
an intercourse decreases the likelihood of contracting 
HIV. These two pieces of information express quali­
tative influences between pairs of variables. A for­
mal interpretation of qualitative influences has been 
proposed by [Wellman, 1990] in terms of statistical 
dominance. This property is also useful in captur­
ing qualitative synergies between variables. A posi­
tive (negative) additive synergy [Wellman, 1990] cap­
tures the property that the joint influence of two 
variables on a third variable is larger (smaller) than 
the sum of their individual influences. In our exam­
ple, condom usage and sexual intercourse are nega­
tively additively synergistic: using a condom dimin­
ishes the influence of having intercourse on contracting 
HIV. Product synergy [Druzdzel and Henrion, 1993; 
Henrion and Druzdzel, 1991; Wellman and Henrion, 
1993], on the other hand, captures intercausal interac­
tion. An example is the negative intercausal interac­
tion known as "explaining away" [Pearl, 1988] which 
models negative influence of the presence of one cause 
on the likelihood of another cause being present given 
an observed common effect. In our example, needle 
sharing and sexual intercourse are negatively product 
synergistic: given HIV infection, factual knowledge 
about needle sharing reduces the likelihood of inter­
course being the cause of the infection. 
These examples demonstrate that practical domains 
offer a wealth of probabilistic information which, al­
though not always in the shape of numbers that are 
directly amenable to encoding in a belief network, may 
facilitate assessing the required probabilities. 
3 CANONICAL FORM 
Our canonical form for interpreting probabilistic infor­
mation builds on the property that any joint probabil­
ity distribution on a set of variables V is uniquely de­
fined by the probabilities of all possible combinations 
of values for all variables from V. If these probabilities 
are known, then any (other) probability from the dis­
tribution can be computed from them by applying the 
basic rules of marginalization and conditioning from 
probability theory. We will call combinations of values 
for all variables constituent assignments. The proba-
bilities of constituent assignments in a joint probability 
distribution will be called its constituent probabilities. 
The set of all possible joint probability distributions 
on V now can be looked upon as spanning a hyper­
space whose dimensions correspond with constituent 
probabilities. 
Any information about the true, yet unknown prob­
ability distribution Pr can now be represented as a 
system of (in)equalities involving this distribution's 
constituent probabilities as unknowns. Any solution 
to this system of (in)equalities is a joint probability 
distribution that is compatible with the available in­
formation. If the system has a unique solution, then 
the information provided suffices for uniquely defin­
ing Pr [van der Gaag, 1991]. Note that in case the 
system does not have any solution at all, the infor­
mation about the unknown distribution Pr is inconsis­
tent. This view of probability is largely based on the 
early work by Boole [Boole, 1958] on the foundations 
of probability theory. 
We introduce some notational conventions. We take 
V = {V1, . . .  , Vn}, n � 1, to be a set of variables, 
where each variable Vi can take one of ki values. We 
will use Vii to denote Vi taking the j-th value from its 
domain, j = 1, ... , ki. Note that the set of all con­
stituent assignments for V comprises k = Tii=l, ... ,n ki elements. 
Now, consider an assignment b for an arbitrary subset 
of variables from V and its unknown probability Pr(b). 
The assignment b can be written as a disjunction of 
constituent assignments Ci using basic logical laws. In 
fact, here exists a unique set of indices Ib � {1, .. .  , k}, 
called the index set for b, such that b = viEh Ci· Since 
all constituent assignments are mutually exclusive, the 
probability Pr(b) can be expressed as the sum of the 
probabilities of the constituent assignments b is built 
from. So, from Pr(b) = L:iElb Pr(ci) we find that Pr(b) 
can be expressed as 
(1) 
where Xi = Pr(ci), i = 1, ... , k, and di = 1 if i E h 
and di = 0 otherwise. 
Example: Consider the example belief network for 
HIV infections from Section 2. There are sixteen con­
stituent assignments for the variables involved; an or­
dered list of these assignments is shown in Table 1. 
Now consider the assignment expressing a person's 
having sexual intercourse without using a condom, 
that is, the assignment fc. This assignment can be 
written as 
ic = hnic v hnzc v hn%7: v hnic 
= C5 V Cg V C10 V C13 
Note that the index set he equals he = {5, 8, 10, 13}. 
The probability Pr( t7:) can now be expressed as 
Pr(ic) = Pr(c5) + Pr(cs) + Pr(cw) + Pr(c13) 
x5 + Xs + xw + X13 
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c1 = hnic cs = hnic eg = hnic 
c2 = hnic cs = hnic c10 = hntc 
c3 = hnic c1 = hnic cu = hn�c 
c4 = hnic cs = hnic c12 = hnic 
c13 = hnic 
c14 = hn'lc 
cl5 = hntc 
c16 = hn'lc 
Table 1: Constituent assignments for the HIV belief 
network. 
Note that in terms of expression (1), we have that d5 = 
ds = d10 = d13 = 1 and di = 0 for all if. 5,8, 10, 13. 
D 
Posterior probabilities are expressed in canonical form 
in a similar way. Consider a posterior probability 
Pr(b1lbz) where b�, b2 denote assignments for sets of 
variables. From Pr(b1lbz) = P;���:)), we have that 
Pr(bdbz) can be expressed as 
d1,1X1 + d2,1X2 + · · · + dk,lXk 
d1,2X1 + dz,2X2 + · · · + dk,2Xk 
where Xi = Pr( ci), and di,l = 1 if i E h1 b2 and di,l = 0 
otherwise, and di,2 = 1 if i E Ib2 and di,2 = 0 other­
wise. Note that di,2 = 1 whenever di,l = 1. 
4 IN TERPRE TATION OF 
PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION 
In this section, we address expressing axiomatic infor­
mation, point estimates, probability intervals, compar­
isons, qualitative influences, and additive synergies in 
our canonical form. We have designed similar expres­
sions for other types of information, such as indepen­
dences, order of magnitude estimates, product syner­
gies, and noisy-OR gates. A technical report providing 
all interpretations is in preparation. 
4.1 AXIOMATIC INFORMATION 
Even if no specific information is available about an 
unknown joint probability distribution, there still is 
probabilistic information that holds for any distribu­
tion. This information concerns the basic axiomatic 
properties of a joint probability distribution. 
The unknown joint probability distribution Pr is 
known to be normed, that is, Pr( true) = 1. This prop­
erty is expressed in canonical form by the equality 
X1 + · · · + Xk = 1 (2) 
where Xi = Pr(ci), i = 1, . . .  , k. 
Also, the probability Pr(b) for any assignment b of a 
set of variables from V is known to be a non-negative 
real number. More in specific, we have that for any 
constituent probability Pr(Ci), i = 1, . . .  , k, the prop­
erty Pr(ci) 2: 0 holds. This information is expressed 
in canonical form in k inequalities of the form 
Xi 2: 0 (3) 
for i = 1, . . .  , k. Note that if all constituent proba­
bilities are non-negative, then all other probabilities 
are non-negative as well. Hence, there is no need to 
specify any additional constraints for this information. 
Also, note that the constraints (2) and (3) imply that 
Pr(b) :::;; 1 for any assignment b. 
4.2 POINT PROB ABILITIES, 
INTERVALS, A ND COMPARISONS 
A point estimate for a prior probability is a statement 
of the form Pr(b) = p, 0 :::;; p :::;; 1, where b is an 
assignment for an arbitrary subset of variables. Let 
h be the index set for b. Then, the point estimate is 
expressed in canonical form as 
d1x1 + · · · + dkxk = p 
where Xi= Pr(ci), i = 1, ... , k, and di = 1 if i E h 
and di = 0 otherwise. 
Example: Consider once more the HIV belief net­
work. The prevalence of HIV infection in the U.S. pop­
ulation is Pr(h) = 0.005 according to morbidity tables. 
This information is expressed in canonical form as 
XI + X3 + X4 + X5 + Xg + X10 + Xll + XI5 = 0.005 
D 
A point estimate for a posterior probability is a state­
ment of the form Pr(b1lb2) = p, 0 :::;; p :::;; 1, where 
b1, b2 denote assignments for sets of variables. From 
Pr(b1lbz) = P;���:)), we have that Pr(b1b2) = p·Pr(b2), 
and therefore Pr(b1 b2) - p · Pr(b2) = 0. The probabil­
ities Pr(b1 b2) and Pr(b2) now are expressed in terms 
of constituent probabilities as before. The point esti­
mate for Pr(bdb2) further indicates that Pr(b2) > 0 
and, therefore, gives rise to yet another inequality in 
terms of constituent probabilities. 
Similar expressions in canonical form are found for 
probability intervals and comparisons of probabilities. 
A probability interval is a statement expressing an up­
per and a lower bound on a prior or posterior prob­
ability. Such a statement may be of the form PI :::;; 
Pr(b) :::;; p2 where b is an assignment for an arbitrary 
subset of variables and PI, P2 are real numbers such 
that 0 :::;; PI < P2 :::;; 1. A comparison between two prior 
probabilities can be of the form a I · Pr(bi) :::;; a2 · Pr(b2) 
where bi, b2 are assignments for subsets of variables 
from V and a1, a2 are (non-negative) real numbers. 
These statements are expressed in canonical form by 
writing the probabilities Pr(b), Pr(bi), and Pr(b2) in 
terms of constituent probabilities. 
4.3 QU ALITATIVE INFLUENCES 
A qualitative influence is a symmetric property de­
scribing the sign of probabilistic interaction between 
two variables VI and V0, and builds on an ordering of 
these variables' values. A positive qualitative influence 
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from vl to Vo expresses that choosing a higher value 
for V1 makes higher values of V0 more likely, regard­
less of the values of other variables. More formally 
[Wellman, 1990], we say that the variable Vi positively 
influences the variable Vo, denoted by s+(VJ, Vo), iff 
for all values v0, of V0, for all pairs of distinct values 
v1; > v1; of Vi, and for all possible assignments b for 
the set of V0 's direct predecessors other than V1, we 
have 
Pr(Vo � Vomivl;b) � Pr(Vo � VomiVJ;b) 
Negative qualitative influence and zero qualitative in­
fluence are defined analogously. 
The statement s+ (V1 , V0) is expressed in canonical 
form by expressing a set of inequalities in this form. 
There is one inequality for each combination of one 
value v0"' of Vo, one pair of values VJ;, v1; of V1, and 
one assignment b of Vo 's other predecessors than Vi; 
this inequality expresses that 
ko ko 
L Pr(vo, ivi ;b) > L Pr(vo,iVI;b) 
l=m l=m 
Note that there are 
( 
� ) · (ko -1) · K such inequali­
ties, where K is the number of possible assignments for 
the set of direct predecessors of Vo other than Vi. As 
these inequalities involve posterior probabilities, each 
of them gives rise to two additional inequalities. 
Example: For quantifying our HIV belief network, 
the available information indicates that needle sharing 
positively influences HIV infection, that is, s+(N, H). 
This statement translates into the four inequalities: 
Pr(hinic) > Pr(hlnic) 
Pr(hinic) > Pr(hinic) 
Pr(hlnic) > Pr(hln�c) 
Pr(hlrizc) > Pr(hin"ic) 
and eight additional inequalities expressing that 
Pr(nic) > 0, ... , Pr(nzc) > 0. Note that the statement 
s+ (N, H) gives rise to the total of twelve inequalities. 
The first inequality mentioned above is expressed in 
canonical form as 
X2X3- XJX6 � 0 
The other inequalities are expressed analogously. 0 
4.4 QUALITATIVE SYNERGIES 
An additive synergy pertains to the joint influence of 
two variables vl and v2 on a third variable Vo, and, 
similarly to qualitative influence, builds on an ordering 
of these variables' values. A positive additive synergy 
of VI and v2 with respect to Vo expresses that the 
joint influence of vl and v2 is greater than the sum of 
their individual influences. More formally [Wellman, 
1990], we say that the variables Vi and V2 exhibit pos­
itive additive synergy with respect to Vo, denoted by 
Y+({V1, V2}, Vo), iff for all values v0"' of Vo, for all 
Pairs of values VJ. > VJ . of V1 and V2 .1 > V2 .1 of V2, ' 3 ' J 
and for all possible assignments b for the set of V0 's 
direct predecessors not including vl and v2, we have 
Pr(Vo 2: VomiVJ;V2;,b) +Pr(Vo � Vo,iVJ;V2;,b) 
2: Pr(Vo 2: Vo,iVJ;V2;,b) +Pr(Vo � Vomiv1;V2;,b) 
Negative additive synergy and zero additive synergy 
are defined analogously. 
The statement y+ ({ V1 , V2}, V0) is expressed in canon­
ical form by a set of inequalities in the above form. 
There is one inequality for each combination of one 
value v0"' of V0, one pair of values v1;, VI; of VI , one 
pair of values v2.,, v2 ., of V2, and one assignment b of . ' 
V0 's other direct predecessors than Vi and V2; there are 
( 
k
2 ) · ( 
k
� ) · (ko -1) · K such inequalities, where 
K is the number of possible assignments for the set 
of direct predecessors of Vo other than V1 and V2. As 
these inequalities involve posterior probabilities, each 
of them gives rise to additional inequalities as outlined 
before. 
Example: Consider once more our HIV belief net­
work under construction. The available information 
indicates that there is a negative additive synergy be­
tween sexual intercourse and using a condom with re­
spect to HIV infection, that is, that y-({J,C},H). 
This statement translates into the two inequalities: 
Pr(h lnic) + Pr(hln"ic) < Pr(hlmc) + Pr(hinic) 
Pr(hinic) + Pr(hin"ic) < Pr(hin�c) + Pr(hinzc) 
and eight additional inequalities expressing that 
Pr(nic) > 0, ... , Pr(nzc) > 0. Note that the statement 
y-( {I, C}, N)  gives rise to the total of ten inequali­
ties. The first inequality above leads to 
-x1X4X5X14 - X2X4X5Xll - 2X2X4X5X14 
+X1X5X7Xu - X2X5X7X14 + XIX4XsXu 
-x2X4XsX14 + 2XJX7XsXu + X1X7XsXI4 
+x2x1xsxu < 0 
The other inequalities are expressed in canonical form 
analogously. 0 
Product synergy pertains to the interaction between 
two variables vl and v2 conditional on their common 
descendant V0 and expresses the sign of what is known 
as intercausal influence between Vi and V2. The most 
common type of product synergy is the negative prod­
uct synergy, capturing the notion of "explaining away." 
We say that the variables V1 and V2 exhibit negative 
product synergy with respect to a particular value v0,. 
of variable Vo, written x-({V�, V2},v0,.), if for all 
pairs of values V2; > V2; of V2 and for all possible 
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assignments b for the set of V0 's direct predecessors 
not including VI and v2, we have 
Pr(Vi � vi,Iv2,vo=b) :S Pr(Vi � vi,Iv2;vo=b) 
Positive product synergy and zero product synergy are 
defined analogously. Note that, in contrast to addi­
tive synergy, product synergy is defined with respect 
to separate values of the common effect V0• There are, 
therefore, as many product synergies as there are val­
ues of Vo. A statement X- ({VI' v2}' Vo=) is expressed 
in canonical form much in the same way as qualitative 
influences and additive synergies. 
It is worth noting that the above definition is con­
siderably less complex than the definition proposed in 
[Druzdzel and Henrion, 1993]. The latter definition 
expresses product synergy in terms of the probability 
of Vo conditional on VI and v2 to allow for derivation 
of the sign of product synergy from an existing condi­
tional distribution encoded in a network. In terms of 
the canonical form proposed in this paper, we can af­
ford defining product synergy in terms of probability 
of VI conditional on v2 and Vo. This does not have 
any effect on the interpretation of statements regard­
ing product synergy yet simplifies the matters greatly. 
5 ELICITATION OF 
PROBABILITIES 
Our method for elicitation of probabilities from a do­
main expert amounts to reasoning about the informa­
tion that is available about the unknown joint proba­
bility distribution. We have illustrated how various 
types of information are expressed in the canonical 
form as a system of (in)equalities with constituent 
probabilities as unknowns. This section shows how 
these (in)equalities can be used to derive second-order 
probability distributions over any probability of inter­
est in the sense suggested by [Pearl, 1988]. 
5.1 DERIVATION OF SECOND-ORDER 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
From the system of (in)equalities resulting from 
expression of available probabilistic information in 
canonical form, we can compute upper and lower 
bounds on any probability of interest. The length 
of a computed interval then indicates the uncertainty 
in the probability's value and hence is a measure for 
the incompleteness of the available information. This 
method has been proposed before by Van der Gaag in 
view of systems of linear (in)equalities [van der Gaag, 
1991]. For probability elicitation, this method has the 
disadvantage that upper and lower bounds on a prob­
ability give insufficient insight into how likely a value 
from the interval is to be the actual probability. Nor 
do these bounds provide an estimate of the expected 
value of the probability. We would like to note that 
for decision making in presence of uncertainty about a 
probability p, knowing the expected value of p suffices, 
even if the distribution over p is unknown [Howard, 
1988]. 
To yield insight in the likelihood of values for the 
true probability, and in particular to be able to de­
rive its expected value, we propose using sampling to 
find second-order distributions for the probabilities to 
be assessed. For computing these second-order distri­
butions, we randomly select points from the distribu­
tion hyperspace, assuming that all points in the hy­
perspace are equally likely to be the true distribution. 
For each selected distribution, we verify its compati­
bility with all available information, that is, we verify 
if it is a solution to the system of (in)equalities de­
rived from this information. All selected distributions 
matching the available information are collected and 
scored for the probabilities to be assessed; the result 
is a second-order distribution over each such proba­
bility. We would like to note that computing second­
order distributions is computationally expensive as it 
involves generating and investigating joint probability 
distributions described by their constituent probabili­
ties and the number of these constituent probabilities 
is exponential in the number of variables discerned. 
Example: Consider once again the HIV infection ex­
ample belief network. We have expressed the following 
probabilistic information about the four variables H, 
N, I, and C in canonical form: Pr(ijc) = 1, Pr(i) > 
Pr(n), Pr(hjn) > Pr(hji), and the information that 
between 10% and 25% of HIV-infectious are caused 
by needle sharing, that is, 0.1 :S Pr(njh) :S 0.25. 
From this information, we derived second-order distri­
butions for the various probabilities to be assessed for 
the network by selecting 10,000 matching joint prob­
ability distributions. The histograms of the samples 
obtained for Pr( i) and Pr(hjn'i"c) are shown in Fig­
ure 2. When normalized, these histograms express a 
second order probability distribution over Pr( i) and 
Pr(hjnic). Note that the information from which we 
derived these distributions did not pertain directly to 
these probabilities. Another point that we would like 
to emphasize here is that knowledge of intervals would 
be useless as the probability Pr(hjn'i"c), for example, 
spans over the entire interval between 0 and 1. D 
We have implemented our method for computing 
second-order distributions in Allegro Common Lisp on 
a Hewlett Packard workstation. Our implementation 
is just a prototype and has been created to serve illus­
trative purposes. As the implementation is straight­
forward, it is rather slow and therefore leaves much 
room for algorithmic improvement. 
Especially when very restrictive information about the 
joint probability distribution is available, randomly 
selecting distributions from the hyperspace tends to 
yield a huge number of samples that are not compat­
ible with the available information and therefore are 
not useful. To improve on the ratio of useful samples, 
we envision a pre-processing step prior to the selec-
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Figure 2: Histograms of the samples for Pr(i) (upper) 
and Pr(hln'i"c) (lower). 
tion of distributions. In this step, a part of the hy­
perspace in which the true joint probability distribu­
tion definitely lies is identified. To this end, all linear 
(in)equalities from the system at hand are collected 
and a standard linear-programming technique is ap­
plied to compute upper and lower bounds on all con­
stituent probabilities. The thus computed bounds are 
guaranteed to be sound: no point in the hyperspace 
outside these bounds can represent the unknown prob­
ability distribution. These bounds, however, may not 
be tight as there may be other, yet unconsidered in­
formation. Selecting distributions is now performed 
within the bounds yielded by the pre-processing step. 
5.2 FOCUSING ELICITATION 
Reasoning about probabilistic information is compu­
tationally expensive. This is not surprising given that 
inference in belief networks is NP-hard [Cooper, 1990]. 
To allow for sidestepping the issue of complexity, we 
divide the problem of reasoning about qualitative and 
quantitative probabilistic information over all statis­
tical variables in the network under construction into 
smaller subproblems and address these separately. 
Division into subproblems is achieved by transforming 
the directed graph of the network into an undirected 
chordal graph that equally models independences from 
the distribution at hand. A chordal graph has the use­
ful property that the joint probability distribution over 
the represented variables factorizes into marginal dis-
tributions on the separate cliques of this graph. This 
property allows for addressing the problem of elicita­
tion of probabilities per clique. For transforming . .the 
directed graph of a belief network into a chordal graph, 
we make use of the transformation scheme designed by 
[Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988]. 
Computational complexity, however, is just one of the 
reasons for focusing elicitation of probabilities on small 
sets of variables. Focusing is also suggested by knowl­
edge acquisition experience both in decision analysis 
and in expert systems design: human experts typi­
cally express information about short causal reasoning 
chains and feel uncomfortable when forced to provide 
more global information. An important property of 
the applied transformation is that, as for any variable 
and its direct predecessors a clique is yielded, causal 
mechanisms are never split up over different cliques 
and hence are never broken. We believe that the ob­
tained cliques form small entities suitable for elicita­
tion. 
6 DISCUSSION 
Although the usefulness of belief networks for repre­
senting and reasoning under uncertainty is widely ac­
cepted, eliciting probabilities for quantifying a network 
is often perceived a problem. It often turns out, how­
ever, that it is the need to express probabilistic infor­
mation as exact numbers that tends to make domain 
experts feel uncomfortable: experts typically are able 
to state probabilistic information of a semi-numerical 
or qualitative nature with conviction and clarity, and 
hence with little cognitive effort. In this paper, we 
have proposed a method that allows for non-invasive 
elicitation of probabilities by interpreting and com­
bining whatever an expert is willing to state. Our 
method can be used iteratively in the sense of start­
ing the elicitation with only most robust and read­
ily available information, and then narrowing down 
the focus of elicitation successively. As elicitation of 
probabilities from domain experts generally is a time­
consuming and costly task, we expect this approach 
to lead to considerable savings. We believe that our 
method provides a valuable supplement to decision­
analytic methods of probability elicitation. 
Even though a non-invasive method of collecting in­
formation from experts may be less prone to conflicts 
than a method eliciting numerical probabilities, the 
constraints elicited may turn out to be inconsistent. 
Inconsistencies can arise from an expert's internal in­
consistency or from disagreement among multiple ex­
perts and can occur either within a clique or between 
cliques. Detection of inconsitencies is quite straightfor­
ward. In accord with the decision analytic approach, 
we view inconsistencies as an additional opportunity 
to refine the elicitation by confronting the expert with 
conflicting statements. We believe that including both 
qualitative and quantitative statements in elicitation 
aids this refinement: qualitative information gener-
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ally is more robust and cognitively reliable. We plan 
to deal with inconsistencies by prioritizing the expert 
statements according to their expected robustness and 
suggesting the least robust constraints for revision. In 
the near future, we envision making our method the 
centerpiece of a general purpose computerized proba­
bility elicitation tool. 
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